The paper itself is a private review candidate. Its claim is set out here in full,
unaltered, so that it can be read and criticised before access is requested.
Against that background, this paper defends two propositions that have now
survived two hostile verification rounds and one external validation cycle, and
develops the research programme they jointly define.
[INFERENCE] Proposition 1 (population effects). The dyadic
frame of agency and antitrust doctrine — one principal, one agent, one
attributable act, one pleadable agreement — is not adequate, as currently
applied, to govern the population-level phenomena of interacting algorithmic
actors: coordination without agreement, convention formation without design, and
cascade dynamics without a responsible dyad. The phenomena have been demonstrated
in controlled settings, with contested external validity. The appellate authority
now runs to two poles: the first appellate court dismissed a claim of algorithmic
coordination for want of an agreement where no competitor data was pooled; the
second sustained a claim at the pleading stage where non-public competitor data
was pooled through a shared algorithm and adherence to its recommendations was
high. Doctrine as applied therefore reaches the pooled-data configuration; it has
not reached, and neither court purported to reach, the controlled
no-agreement/no-pooled-data configuration demonstrated in Calvano-type
experiments. The enforcement path that might close the remaining gap has so far
ended in settlement and pleading-stage reversal, not adjudication.
[INFERENCE] Proposition 2 (the recognition boundary). A layered
private authorisation stack for synthetic actors — mandate protocols, agent
identity attestations and network-level tokenisation — is deployed today across
payment networks, operates cross-jurisdictionally as a matter of commercial
acceptance, and has begun to converge under a single standards process; sovereign
legal recognition of foreign-constituted machine mandates remains substantially
unbuilt. Domestic registration and governance developments must be classified
case by case and do not themselves establish sovereign legal recognition.
Synthetic actors inherit a pre-existing sovereign recognition gap and their
machine-speed operation transforms its consequences.
Private ordering is building functional commercial recognition of synthetic
authority; sovereign legal recognition of foreign-constituted machine mandates
remains substantially unbuilt. What admission rules, rents, capture risks and
contestability questions follow from that asymmetry is the research object of
this paper.
Three subsidiary contributions follow: an empirical-methodological economics of
authority organised around recognition costs and permission rents (Section 4); a
narrowed, doctrinally precise Lex Synthetica — when machine-generated convention
becomes legally cognisable usage of trade (Section 6); and a design taxonomy for
adversarial oversight of machine-speed recognition systems (Section 7).
Quoted verbatim from Working Paper No. 1 v0.3-RC1, Section 1. The bracketed tags are
the paper's own claim classification. The full paper is a private review candidate
prepared for external scholarly criticism —
enquire about review access.